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A DISPASSIONATE AND TRUTHFUL REVIEW OF THE
SITUATION IN THE ISLAND OF CUBA, AND THE
POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
TOWARD THE INSURRECTION

BY AN AMERICAN

NEW YORK, 1895

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THE CUBAN QUESTION

IN ITS TRUE LIGHT.

I.

UNRELIABILITY OF CUBAN NEWS.

A great deal has been written about the Cuban question in the American newspapers, but, as those conversant with the true state of affairs in the Island of Cuba know, there is, in the majority of the reports which find their way into print, so much that is utterly false, that they give the public no reliable information from which to derive a correct knowledge and on which to base a fair judgment of the situation in the "Pearl of the Antilles."

The requirements of the daily press—the aim of every newspaper being to outdo the others in the publication of sensational news—make it a difficult, almost an impossible task for the news editor to carefully weigh the value of every piece of information received, and to winnow the grains of truth out of the immense amount of chaff which is served to the daily press as news.

There are in the United States a number of Cuban refugees who are naturally interested in magnifying the extent

and scope of the present rebellion, and they avail themselves of every opportunity to spread exaggerated reports of victories in the field and to pour into the ears of sympathizing Americans tales of misery and woe. Key West, Tampa and Jacksonville are the principal hotbeds of Cuban filibusters, and these have agents who make it their business to concoct and transmit North such fabulous tales purporting to come from Cuba, as to make all dispatches dated at those places entirely unreliable.

MISSTATEMENTS OF THE PRESS.

It is generally from such sources as these that American newspapers derive the information which they serve up to an unsuspecting public under the guise of news, without taking the trouble to ascertain the truth or falsity of their reports. Thus we have read in a leading paper a cablegram announcing the gallant feat of a Spanish officer, whose death had been reported by the same newspaper a few days before. Thus we have been told of the capture by the insurgents of so important a town as Santa Clara, even the location of the town being shown on a map, on the very day that General Martinez Campos made Santa Clara his head-quarters, and yet the paper which boasted of this great feat of journalism, allowed the false report to remain uncontradicted in its columns. Thus we have read, day after day, the most absurd and extravagant tales about the progress of the Cuban rebellion and the atrocities committed by the Spanish soldiers, until the public mind has become bewildered and confused, and public opinion has erred in its judgment on the Cuban question.

AN APPEAL TO AMERICAN COMMON-SENSE.

It is for the purpose of setting public opinion right that these pages are now written. The American people love

truth and fair play, and they are always to be found on the side of right and justice. No fair judge would pass sentence upon a case without hearing the evidence on both sides, and no fairer judge can be found than the American people when their honest good sense is appealed to. Almost all that has been said so far in this country about the Cuban question has been inspired by the insurgents themselves or by their agents and sympathizers. It would be interesting to know what Spain has to say on the subject. But in the absence of any presentment of the Spanish side of the case, it should be the endeavor of all impartial and fair-minded people to examine the question without prejudice, putting sentimentality aside, and seeking only the truth in order to form a correct and intelligent opinion.

II.

A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW.

In the first place, let us see how and by whom this insurrection was brought about.

There is no nobler or higher aspiration in the heart of man than the desire for independence. To Americans this feeling must be for ever dear ; as it was the origin, the foundation, the corner-stone of our great and glorious country. One after another the various possessions of Spain on the continent of the New World have severed their political ties with the mother country, just as the thirteen English colonies in North America severed their ties with Great Britain.

Cuba and Porto Rico are the only possessions left to Spain in this hemisphere, which she discovered and in a great degree peopled. By reason of the richness and fertility of their soil, and—let us acknowledge it frankly—by dint of energy, activity and thrift on the part of the Spaniards, those two islands, and more especially Cuba, have so prospered in the development of their agriculture as to be among the richest and most productive regions in the world.

About the middle of this century, Narciso Lopez, with a few followers, raised the cry of independence and took up arms against Spain. The movement was short-lived, because the great majority of the inhabitants of Cuba frowned upon it as impeding the true interests and prosperity of the Island.

Eighteen years later, in 1868, a group of Cubans headed by Cespedes raised again the cry of independence at Yara, and this time the spirit of rebellion spread throughout a great

portion of the island, many among the better class of native Cubans—lawyers, planters, men of brains and wealth—either joining the ranks of the rebels or aiding the cause with the sinews of war. The struggle lasted ten years, for the insurgents received valuable aid in the shape of armed expeditions which managed to leave the United States and land on the Cuban shores. However, the great majority of the inhabitants continued loyal to Spain, and the insurrection was finally quelled by General Martinez Campos, who, by the treaty of Zanjón, permitted the rebel chiefs to leave the Island, promising at the same time a more liberal policy in the government of Cuba, including its representation in the Cortes.

THE ZANJON AGREEMENT.

We have no less an authority than General Campos himself, a man whose honesty has never been questioned, for the statement that all the promises made by him at Zanjón have been religiously fulfilled by Spain.

As a matter of fact, the conditions submitted by the rebel chiefs at Zanjón on the 10th of February, 1878, to General Martinez Campos, previous to their surrender and as a basis of peace, embodied the following demands: First—That the Island of Cuba be granted similar politic, organic and administrative reforms as those already adopted in Porto Rico. Second—General amnesty to all political offenders and persons engaged in the rebellion. Third—That all the slaves having taken part in the insurrection be set free. Fourth—That the Spanish Government will permit and facilitate the leaving of the Island to any of the insurgents wishing to do so.

Not only were all of the above demands acquiesced in by the Spanish Government, but, as is well known, slavery in

Cuba was subsequently abolished, and since then Cuba has enjoyed all the political liberties of a free people, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, and representation in the Spanish Cortes by popular suffrage, being among them. Other reforms of a broader and more liberal scope, such as will give Cuba a sort of administrative home-rule, were but lately submitted to the Cortes by Señor Maura, Minister of the Colonies, and, slightly modified by his successor, Señor Abarzuza, a Cuban by birth and a republican at heart, were unanimously adopted by men of all parties.

ORIGIN OF THE INSURRECTION.

For many years past, and while the Spanish Government was planning to grant to Cuba the above reforms, a hot-headed youth, a poet and orator, carried away by his imagination, took upon himself the task of setting Cuba free, and he started a campaign of fiery denunciation against Spain, both from the press and from the rostrum. This enthusiastic, nay, fanatic agitator, was José Martí. Strange to say, he did not attempt to preach in Cuba. All his philippics were delivered from a safe distance—either from the United States or Central or South America. He went from place to place, visited all the cigar factories where Cubans were employed, fired their hearts and turned their heads with his eloquence, and taxed their purses towards one end: the conquest of Cuba.

Yes, the conquest of Cuba, for the present insurrection was planned outside the Island, was fed from without, all the chief leaders came from without and the arms and ammunitions have been constantly sent from without to sustain the movement.

ATTITUDE OF CUBAN REFUGEES.

It is not the inhabitants of Cuba who have revolted against Spain, but the few thousand Cubans who reside in the United States and elsewhere. Now, the great majority of these Cubans have acquired American citizenship through a long residence here, and have thereby forfeited all right to be considered Cubans. They cannot be Cubans and American citizens at one and the same time. They are naturalized here, they follow their pursuits here, they have adopted the United States as their country, and they have no right to speak in the cause of Cuba as Cubans, much less to take arms against a nation with which the United States, the country of their adoption, is at peace.

By so doing they show that they care not a tittle for their American citizenship, and that they have only acquired it as a cloak to protect them in their evil designs. While we, Americans, are proud of giving shelter to political refugees from all lands and welcome to our country those who renounce their allegiance to European potentates; while we invite the oppressed of every nation to come here and enjoy the blessings of liberty and freedom, it is revolting to our patriotic feeling to find that our hospitality is abused and that the most sacred of our institutions, the most valued of all our possessions, that of American citizenship, is only used as a temporary cloak for men who avail themselves of the protection it affords to further their own individual ends, even at the cost of involving this country in international complications.

For, be it observed, these new-fledged American citizens who wage war against Spain from the United States and send armed expeditions to feed the Cuban insurrection, have no business in the Island of Cuba, no possessions of any kind

there, no interests at stake. They were simply born there; many came here during their childhood, and yet, should the Island become independent from Spain, they would readily throw over their American citizenship and return to Cuba to profit by the political changes in the Island.

Is the opinion of such persons entitled to respect and worthy of consideration? Is their clamoring to be taken as the expression of the will of the inhabitants of Cuba? Do they voice the sentiments, the aspirations, the wishes of the people who have holdings and business interests in the Island?

III.

DOES CUBA WANT TO BE FREE?

It would be well to pause before answering this question : Does Cuba want to be free? It would be wise, before answering, to examine the question closely. We must confess that "Free Cuba" sounds very well to American ears, but there should be more than an empty sound in it to satisfy the thinking mind.

Does Cuba want to be free?

Well, *who* are the people of Cuba? Are a few thousands of Cubans scattered throughout the United States, who have become American citizens, are *they* Cuba? Are a few thousand mulattoes and hot-headed youths, led by a few agitators who have gone to the Island from abroad and are now roving through the mountains, burning plantations and wrecking trains, are *they* Cuba?

The former are about ten thousand in number, the latter are not more than twenty thousand: thirty thousand in all, refugees, outcasts, bandits, agitators, demagogues, ignorant mulattoes; are *these* Cuba?

THE PEOPLE OF CUBA.

No. Cuba has a population of about one million and a half inhabitants. Of these, all but the twenty thousand encamped in the mountain fastnesses, are opposed to the independence of the Island. Not a town, not a seaport, has

hoisted the flag of secession. At Havana, at Santiago de Cuba, at Cienfuegos, at Matanzas, at Nuevitas, at Guantánamo, at Manzanillo, at all the seaports, the landing of Spanish troops has been hailed with delight, and all the streets have been decorated with flags and bunting to celebrate their arrival. Does this look as if Cuba wanted to be independent? It is fair to assume that if the majority of the inhabitants of Cuba wanted to be free from Spanish rule, no Spanish army would be sufficient to quell the movement.

But those who know anything about Cuba, well know that all the land-owners, sugar planters, tobacco growers and manufacturers, the bankers, merchants, in fact, all the business men in Cuba are opposed to the secession of the Island, for to them independence would mean political chaos and total ruin. Should, then, the insensate desire of twenty thousand rebels be placed in the balance with all the business interests in the Island? Should the clamor of a few roving guerilla bands weigh more in the estimation of thinking Americans than the quiet and steady pursuit of their business of one million and a half people?

To show sympathy with the secessionists is to show ignorance of what is going on in Cuba, for no intelligent American would sympathize with outlaws who seek by the employment of dynamite and the torch to destroy the lives and the property of unoffending people. What if the political cry of these rebels be Free Cuba! When the great, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants is against secession, that cry ceases to be the rallying cry of a people and becomes the clamor of a rabble.

OUR PLAIN DUTY.

To us, as Americans, it would be a source of gratification to see the last vestige of monarchical rule disappear from

this hemisphere, and no doubt the time will come when our aspirations in this respect shall be fulfilled. But the question which confronts us at the present moment is not to be decided by sentimental feeling. Is the present Cuban rebellion likely to further the accomplishment of that desire? Has it assumed such proportions as warrant our interference? Can we consistently lend a helping hand, either morally or materially, to the insurgents without stultifying ourselves before the world and without violating, not only international laws and the obligations imposed on us by our treaty with Spain, but also that Christian principle which has been laid down as the golden rule for all mankind? Shall we do to others what we would never suffer others to do to us? This is the question before us.

THE MAJORITY RULE.

No matter what we may say or do, Spain has just as much right to Cuba as the United States has to any of our Western States. She has held undisputed possession of Cuba for the last four hundred years—ever since she discovered America—and she is determined to keep it at any cost. If the Cubans want to be free, they will have to gain their independence by force of arms, as other Spanish possessions have done. But, as we have shown, the great majority of Cubans do not desire independence, and why should we, Americans, seek to dictate to the inhabitants of Cuba what they should have? Why should we uphold and aid a small minority in the attempt to impose their will upon the great majority? Why should we interpose at all? So long as our peace is not menaced, so long as our commerce is not disturbed, so long as Spain fulfils the obligations imposed upon her by her treaty with us, we have no right to meddle

in the family quarrel. If we were to take sides with all the insurgents who now and again disturb the peace of every Spanish-American republic, we should indeed be kept busy.

It may be argued that Americans cannot consistently, with their principles, remain indifferent to the appeal of an oppressed people who clamor for freedom and independence. This would be true—if it were true! But we have shown that Cuba, that is, the wealthy, intelligent and industrious classes, the immense majority of the Cuban people, have not made any such appeal, nor do they want to sever their connection from Spain. We have heard the clamor of twenty thousand malcontents who have nothing to lose, but we seem to forget that there are in Cuba, on the other side, one million and a half people from whom yet nothing has been heard.

IV.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN CUBA.

There are in Cuba three regularly organized political parties, with their central juntas, committees and clubs scattered throughout the Island. These parties are: the *Union Constitucional*, composed of conservative Spaniards, who wish Cuba to be governed like any other Spanish province; the *Reformista*, composed of Spaniards and Cubans, who favor the adoption of liberal reforms, and the *Autonomista* or home-rule party, composed mainly of native Cubans, who aspire to a form of government similar to that of Canada, under the Spanish flag. With the exception of a small number of individuals who in their hearts wish it were possible for the Island to be independent of Spain and yet well governed, and a smaller number still who think that annexation to the United States would be the best solution, all the inhabitants of Cuba who are not in the insurrection belong to one of these three parties.

THE SPANISH ELEMENT.

One fact must not be lost sight of in considering the Cuban question, and that is, that there is a large number of Spaniards established in business throughout the island. The native Cubans, as a general rule, incline more to the professions—as law, medicine, engineering, and agriculture—than to commerce and manufactures.

With the exception of a small number of sugar plantations owned and managed by native Cubans, the wealth of the Island, both as regards landed property and industrial

and commercial enterprises, is mainly in the hands of Spaniards, who marry Cuban women and settle permanently in Cuba; and a few Germans and Americans.

Naturally, the Spaniards remain firm in their loyalty to Spain. A few of them are ultra-conservatives and opposed to the adoption of liberal ideas; but the bulk of the Spaniards favor a more advanced policy, and to their party, the Reformista party, is principally due the plan of liberal reforms laid before the Spanish Cortes and adopted by it.

THE HOME-RULERS' PARTY.

The *Autonomistas*, or home-rulers, go a step further and want Cuba to govern herself. Still, they have accepted the plan of reforms as a step in the right direction. To this party belong the most talented natives of Cuba, who really voice the sentiments of their countrymen. This party also sends its representatives to the Spanish Congress, and they have made known to the government and people of Spain the wishes and aspirations of the native Cubans. It is to this party that we must look for the true expression of the will of the Cuban people, if by the Cuban people we mean only those born in Cuba, and if we are to disregard altogether the numerous, wealthy, and important Spanish element in the Island.

A PARTY PLATFORM.

At the outbreak of the present insurrection the Home-rule party issued a manifesto in which the following paragraphs occur:

* * * It is a question of importance for the Autonomist party, who is the depository of the hopes and ideals of the Cuban people—as embodied in its well-matured and unswerving political platform—and the

only opposition party having a legitimate organization in this country, to make a frank statement of its position and principles. And furthermore, it is the duty of the party to unite, as far as feasible, the opinion and sentiment of all those who have faith in its loyalty, and confidence in its patriotism, especially at a time when the Supreme Government is making extraordinary efforts to suppress the rebellion, and when the entire country, and especially those who pretend to represent it faithfully, should aid to maintain order and protect general interests.

The disturbance has occurred at a time when a new order of affairs was about to be inaugurated, to obtain which our Deputies and Senators have worked with most faithful and honorable perseverance. * * * This cry of insurrection has been stupidly uttered from abroad—thus placing in jeopardy other people's lives and endangering other people's interests—by a group of conspirators, totally irresponsible, who have lived many years away from the country, the real condition and needs of which they do not know, and who pretend to free others from evils which they did not wish to share with them; neither will they share to-morrow the evils which their hot-headedness and culpable machinations may bring upon us, nor will they risk the dangers which surround the misguided instruments of their folly.

The Liberal Autonomist party, which has at all times condemned revolutionary steps, should, and does condemn, with more earnestness the present revolt, initiated at a time when its representatives in Congress had just voted for an organic reform of great importance. The Liberal Autonomist party condemns disorders of all kinds, because it is a legitimate party, having faith in constitutional methods, in the efficiency of campaign education, in the irresistible power of thought, and it affirms that armed revolutions, save in entirely exceptional and extreme circumstances—which rarely present themselves in the existence of a country—are great and terrible afflictions, dire calamities for an enlightened people, which, by means of peaceful evolution, the reform of institutions, and through progress and weight of public opinion, can succeed in reaching the goal of its reasonable desires and legitimate aspirations. Besides, our party is fundamentally Spanish, because we aim essentially and exclusively at home-rule. For that reason, ever since the birth of our party, we have inscribed on our banner "Liberty, Peace and National Unity."

Among the progressive conquests, peacefully obtained, mainly through the efforts of our party, it will suffice to recall the abolition of slavery and the patron-system, the adoption of the new Constitution, the liberty of the press, of public meeting, of association, of public instruction and worship, to the same extent and with the same guarantees as in the mother-country—a very important point gained for a people which until a short time ago was governed by antiquated laws. Furthermore, we have gained the suppression of the differential flag and export duties ;

the reduction of more than 85 per cent. of the budget incurred by the last war; the public and official acceptance by all political parties, of a great part of our financial programme, and the recognition of the principle of decentralization, which will gradually and logically bring about the practical application of our political platform.

In lieu of these tangible advantages and of the prospective advancement so confidently expected, what can the self-appointed liberators offer us? The horrors of a civil war, a bloody struggle between sons of the same country, which may, in the near future, assume a very sinister character, leaving complete ruin in its train, and leading to fatal retrocession in the path of civilization.

A HOME-RULER'S VIEWS.

And lately, one of the most eminent of the home-rulers, Señor Montoro, who was sent to the Spanish Congress as a representative of the party, had occasion to visit the United States, and in an interview with a representative of a New York journal, gave expression to the following sentiments:

Señor Montoro says the importance of the revolutionary movement in Cuba has been greatly exaggerated in the United States. It began with but few elements of success a few months ago, but its inception was attended by the usual contagiousness of such movements in the tropics. The revolution has assumed limited proportions in Las Villas and Camaguey. Its greatest strength is in the eastern department of the Island, or Santiago de Cuba. The majority of the rebels there are colored people. In Las Villas and Camaguey there are some whites with them.

"How many men have taken the field?" he was asked.

"Perhaps," replied Señor Montoro, "10,000 to 15,000, all sorts and conditions of men, with the exception of a few young men, well connected, but without means or influence. The rebellion has no backing—no man of ascertained social position or wealth.

"The rebellion will end in failure. The elements of cohesion, influence and means are lacking. It is a disturbance created by a mere minority, led by men from without the Island, men who had no real knowledge of the substantial progress being made by one party for Cuban autonomy. As to the after effects, the revolution can only add to the Island's taxation by an increase in the public debt. This will be the inheritance left. Naturally, it will retard progress temporarily. It will be wholly barren of future results."

"How long will the war last?" was asked.

"It will last during the present wet season and on into the dry season," Señor Montoro replied. "During the torrential rains of the wet season the country parts of Cuba are an ocean of clayey mud such as precludes the movements of large and trained bodies of men. During the dry season, November and December, and on to May, activity will be noted."

"What has been the politico-economic situation since the men from without invaded Cuba?"

"Previous to this wholly uncalled-for invasion by outsiders, the politico-economic situation had been steadily improving. The Autonomists, or home-rulers, were working cheerfully, and were hopeful, with home-rule almost in sight, when the invasion occurred."

"Does the existing state of affairs cause your party any anxiety?"

"We fear that the invasion may temporarily check our progress.***

"The aim and end of the party's ambition is colonial home-rule—in short a political system like Canada's, a system modified to suit our Island. Early in this year, before any invasion was thought of, the Cortes voted the Ley de Abarzuza. It was passed February 14th. This law of Abarzuza takes its name from the then acting Minister for the colonies. He is a Cuban by birth, but for many years has been a resident of Madrid. We accepted it as a compromise measure—a mean between our maximum wants and the views of the Conservatives. We accepted it as a law on which supplemental legislation could be grafted. It gave us a measure of home-rule for Cuba. A body of representatives, half nominative and half to be elected by the people of Cuba, a body competent to deal with all Cuban questions."

* * * * *

"How long has Cuba had imperial representation by sending her Senators and Deputies to Madrid?"

"Since 1878, or the close of the ten years' war. During the early years following the war, our efforts as a party in the Senate and Cortes were devoted to measures for the abolition of slavery in Cuba, and the acquiring of public liberties for all classes—white and colored. Previous to 1879 the whites in Cuba had social privileges, according to the ancient laws of Spain, but they had no political rights. *To-day all classes in Cuba enjoy the fullest measure of social and political rights.* The Autonomist deputies in Madrid and Cuba have been greatly aided by the press. A primary and most important feature of our work was the abolition of slavery and the acquisition of full rights for all." * * *

"Will the Autonomist party give any aid to the rebels?"

"No. We are pledged by our promises and history to oppose all such attempts—firmly pledged by our entire platform. The rebels have

had neither moral nor material support from the Autonomist party. The Autonomist party is pledged to support Spain. We are perfectly loyal to her. We want home-rule under the Spanish flag."

"What do the Cubans think of General Martinez Campos?"

"General Martinez Campos enjoys popularity in Cuba. He is the man for the time and the emergency. He closed the 1868 to 1878 war amid the applause and heartfelt thanks of the Cubans. As a great military commander he needs no praise of mine. He is a man of superior intelligence, of broad and advanced ideas—a man with a noble and kind heart. Gen. Campos can solve the difficulty now, as formerly. He has the confidence of all true Cubans irrespective of color or station in life. This has great moral weight on the Island. They now rely on him to re-establish peace and maintain it. The autonomists to a man are friendly to him." * * * * *

"Is there any annexation talk in Cuba?"

"No practical politician would think of such a thing. It is not an issue. It has not been thought of. *We, Cubans, want Cuba for Spain. To repeat my earlier statement, home-rule for Cuba, under the Spanish flag.*"

"If such a feeling existed, is Cuba sufficiently advanced to become an American dependency?"

"No one has thought of such a thing. The Cubans are Hispano-Americans. Their ways of living and methods and religion are those of Spain. Cuba could not be assimilated by any power. Cuba in the future, as in the past, will be a Spanish colony. As a people, we are in our infancy. Seventeen years ago we had slavery, and it existed as late as 1886. Besides, consider the climatic conditions—we are a tropical people."

"If home-rule be accorded to Cuba, will the home-rulers ever become a source of danger to Spain?"

"No, Cuba is a Spanish colony. We want a local government like Canada, her rights and privileges, *but we want them under the Spanish flag.* Owing to the many elements in Cuba, recently a slave-holding country, we must have a good and firm government; *Cuba could not govern herself.*"

"What caused the present revolution?"

"It was fully elaborated in New York by the late José Martí and others. They were in touch with a few rebellious spirits in Southern Cuba. It so developed, and came wholly from without."

"Is your party composed solely of whites?"

"By no means. Many of our members are colored people, loyal to Spain and loyal to Cuba. In conclusion, the revolution cannot succeed. Morally, the revolution is crushed. Our hopes were at a zenith when aliens invaded our Island."

V.

STEREOTYPED MISREPRESENTATIONS.

Among the misrepresentations which have come to be looked upon as incontrovertible truths by a too credulous public, are the following:

That the Cubans are oppressed;

That they are tax-ridden;

That they do not hold public offices;

That Cuba is drained of her wealth to fill the coffers of Spain.

These have become stereotyped phrases in the newspapers and in the speeches of sympathizing orators, who either do not know what they are talking about, or who say these things for effect, in order to influence public opinion—for a consideration oftentimes. It is evident that some of the correspondents sent to Cuba by the American newspapers have fallen, as it were, while in the field of operations, under the uncontrollable influence of the rebel leaders. They have taken good care to shed no light on the Cuban question, but on the contrary, have done their best to misinform and mislead the public. Had they been truthful, they would have said what everybody in the Island, and many outside of it, know to be the facts, viz.: that Cubans enjoy entire political liberty; that they are not taxed as heavily as we are in the United States; that Cubans are to be found in all public offices, and that, more favored than the Spaniards, they are exempt from military and naval service in the rank and file, although they can be, and many are, officers in both army and navy; and lastly,

that Cuba, far from being a source of revenue to Spain, is a constant drain upon her treasury.

All these facts ought to be familiar to those who speak or write about Cuba; but when an important daily paper asserts in an editorial article that Spain has three times promised to Cuba representation in Congress and has each time broken her promise, in spite of the well known fact that Cuba has for many years past been represented in the Spanish Cortes, is it to be wondered at that such gross misrepresentations should find credence?

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS.

Anybody who has visited Cuba and has had an opportunity to study its customs, its manners, and its social and political life, knows that its people enjoy the same political liberties and civil rights as their brethren of the Peninsula, and we have no less an authority than that of the great orator and republican, Emilio Castelar, for the statement that Spain enjoys to-day all the political freedom which is consistent with a monarchical form of government, as much liberty, indeed, as any other country under the same form of government. And Señor Montoro, the Cuban home-ruler, as quoted above, declares that "*to-day all classes in Cuba enjoy the fullest measure of social and political rights.*"

The political and administrative reforms adopted by the Spanish Cortes for Cuba, with the hearty concurrence of all parties, just before the present insurrection broke out, and which will be put in operation as soon as peace is restored, will give the two Antilles a greater measure of liberty than even that which is enjoyed by their sister provinces in the mother country.

WHAT DO THE CUBANS WANT.

It is such reforms as these, and a few other measures, such as the abolishment of the existing commercial laws between Spain and Cuba, the enactment of more liberal navigation laws and a revision of the tariff, which will satisfy the great majority of the Cubans, meaning by this not only the native population, but also the more progressive and far-seeing of the Spaniards residing in the Island.

These are the *bona fide* demands which Cuba and Porto Rico make upon Spain, and these they respectfully present and submit to the Cortes through their elected representatives. Spain, as history shows, has been granting to both Antilles all the reforms they have asked for, including the abolition of slavery, slowly and gradually, but surely. Would it not be justly considered an unwarrantable interference on the part of the United States were she to intermeddle in this matter by urging Spain to comply with the above demands made by the majority of the Cubans through their senators and representatives? What then is to be thought of the proposed interference by the United States on behalf of a very small minority, which have placed themselves beyond the pale of the law, by taking up arms and making raids, not only upon the property of the Spanish government, but also upon the property of peaceful citizens? How can the United States consistently, with her boast of being in the vanguard of civilization, go out of her way to give moral aid and support to a few scattered guerrilla bands that are disturbing the peace of a friendly nation, burning plantations, destroying railroads, telegraphs and bridges, and using dynamite with the relentless fury of anarchists? How low must those hold the dignity of our nation who urge Congress and the government to

take sides with such desperadoes, and recognize them as respectable and civilized belligerents!

CUBAN TAXATION.

The assertion that the present rebellion is due to the intolerable oppression of the Cubans by Spain in burdensome taxation is disproved by the character of those in arms. Does any intelligent person imagine that those bandits and mulattoes are tax-payers? And their agents, friends and sympathizers in the United States, are they in any way affected by the taxes in Cuba? No; the taxes have nothing to do with the present rebellion, nor are the taxes in Cuba so high as to excite anybody's indignation.

They can certainly be made to appear very high by juggling with the figures, as the malicious correspondent of a prominent New York paper has done in a letter from Havana, wherein he states that the annual taxation of the Island of Cuba amounts to \$93,400,000; and in order to make it reach this sum he proceeds to doctor the items and the figures in the most extraordinary manner.

As many persons, not having any means of verifying this statement, may have given it credence, it will not be amiss to expose here the methods by which the public is willfully misled. There are very few, among those who declaim against the burdens imposed by Spain on Cuban tax-payers, who take the trouble of ascertaining what is the amount of taxation in Cuba.

GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES.

We have before us the official text of the budgets for the Island of Cuba for the fiscal year 1895-6, and we can, there-

fore, supply the figures. The total expenditures are estimated at \$26,095,244.19, divided as follows :

General expenses.....	\$12,578,335 60
Department of Justice.....	995,693 51
War Department.....	5,896,740 73
Treasury Department.....	762,125 00
Navy Department.....	1,055,186 13
Department of the Interior.....	4,036,088 22
Public Works	771,125 00
	<hr/>
	<u>\$26,095,244 19</u>

The total revenues of the Island are estimated at \$24,755,759,87½, although they actually yield no more than \$22,000,000. The different sources of revenue are as follows :

DIRECT TAXES AND IMPOSTS—

Including all taxes on real-estate, mining, industries, excise, inher- itances, etc.....	\$7,049,500 00
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INDIRECT TAXES—

Custom-House revenue.....	11,890,000 00
Revenue stamps taxes.....	2,174,659 87½
Lottery revenues.....	3,104,000 00
Public lands and properties.....	399,000 00
Contingent revenue.....	138,600 00
	<hr/>
	<u>\$24,755,759 87½</u>

To the student of economics these will not appear as very oppressive taxes, considering the wealth and population of the Island of Cuba. Indeed, it will surprise many who know the value of its extensive sugar and tobacco plantations, with an annual production of nearly \$100,000,000, to learn that the total revenue derived from the taxes on rural properties amounts to only \$316,000.

VI.

THE COMMERCIAL STAND-POINT.

It has been proved that the people of Cuba do not want the independence of the Island, and now I will demonstrate that Cuban independence, from a commercial point of view, would not be advantageous to the United States.

Of all the countries south of us, the Spanish West Indies are foremost in business relations with the United States. Our trade with Cuba and Porto Rico is larger by far than any we have with either Mexico, Central America, or some of the republics of South America, and even Canada does not make a better showing than the Spanish Antilles, if we take the *per capita* rate of importations from the United States.

Figures are uncontrovertible arguments, and they clearly show that the fiscal laws of Spain are not so oppressive as to obstruct the commerce between her two islands and their best and principal market, that of the United States. Besides, I might quote some diplomatic correspondence in evidence of Spain's constant readiness and desire for negotiating commercial treaties with the United States, in lieu of the many-times renewed, extended, but unsatisfactory *modus vivendi*.

COMPARATIVE TRADE-STATISTICS.

The following statistics from the "U. S. Treasury Department Report on Foreign Commerce and Navigation," for the year ending June 30, 1893, show the importance of our commerce with the Spanish islands:

	U. S. IMPORTS.	U. S. EXPORTS.
Cuba	\$78,706,506	\$24,157,698
Porto Rico.....	4,008,623	2,510,607
	<hr/> \$82,715,129	<hr/> \$26,668,305

Now let us compare these figures with the following, referring to our trade with the other West Indies islands :

	U. S. IMPORTS	U. S. EXPORTS
British West Indies....	\$16,028,592	\$8,044,846
French West Indies....	8,340	1,818,955
Santo Domingo.....	2,368,620	1,443,479
Hayti.....	736,021	5,472,040
	<hr/> \$19,141,573	<hr/> \$16,779,320

Mexico, notwithstanding its proximity to our territory and its railroad communications with the United States—and the fact that its population is seven or eight times larger than that of Cuba—only makes the following array, under the same columns :

	U. S. IMPORTS.	U. S. EXPORTS.
Mexico	\$33,555,099	\$19,568,634

Altogether the five republics of Central America buy in the United States only one-fifth of the amount bought by Cuba and Porto Rico, according to the following official statistics.

	U. S. IMPORTS.	U. S. EXPORTS.
Costa Rica.....	\$2,309,558	\$1,210,740
Guatemala'.....	2,554,578	1,763,862
Honduras.....	684,912	471,695
Nicaragua.....	1,338,867	937,859
Salvador.....	1,355,730	1,138,430
	<hr/> \$ 8,603,675	<hr/> \$ 5,533,086

Let us now look at the figures relating to South America :

Venezuela sells us \$3,625,118 and buys \$4,207,661. Colombia sends us \$3,571,918 and buys \$3,155,777. All Central America, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela combined, Spanish-speaking countries not under Spanish rule,—are hardly ahead of Cuba and Porto Rico.

Brazil, with a population of nearly 10,000,000 and which is considered as a good field for our exports, only buys \$12,388,124, and the rest of South America, comprising the Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are customers of the United States to the extent of merely \$17,768,666—almost ten millions less than Cuba and Porto Rico.

The two islands under Spanish rule, according to official trade-statistics are, indeed, very profitable neighbors for the United States. Does any one imagine that they would do as well if they were free and independent republics? Any one who knows the constituent parts of their population must needs be convinced that, if left to govern themselves, those two islands would soon follow in the footsteps of Santo Domingo and Hayti.

INEVITABLE CALAMITIES WOULD FOLLOW.

One of the first effects of the independence of Cuba, would be to drive away the valuable Spanish element who now contribute so considerably to the wealth and the intelligent development of the Island. The exodus of that element would carry with it the wives and children, who form a considerable part of the white native population, and, as a natural consequence, the blacks would then predominate and rule the Island.

No matter how you may turn or twist things, this would be the inevitable result of Cuban independence. It would leave at our doors a very quarrelsome and disturbing element, which would suddenly but surely cease to be a profitable factor in our foreign trade. If American producers and manufacturers knew the true condition of affairs in Cuba, they would strenuously oppose any attempt at freeing the Island from Spanish rule.

ANNEXATION OUT OF THE QUESTION.

No one, of impartial and sound mind, will contend that the acquisition of the Island of Cuba, at the present time, would be of any advantage to the United States. I will not enter into the merit of this proposition ; I will simply dismiss it with the statement that the United States are not anxious to swallow a pill, even sugar-coated, but unassimilable to its political pharmacopæ. Cuba is too thoroughly Spanish to be Americanized at short notice, and become a good and peaceful member in the family of American States.

Besides, Spain does not seem willing to relinquish the Island, nor do the Cubans themselves wish to become part of a country, so dissimilar in every respect to their own.

VII.

CHARACTER OF THE INSURRECTION.

Nothing is easier than to draw a crowd together and make them cheer enthusiastically for something which they know nothing about. Such has been the case of late in several parts of the United States in regard to the Cuban insurgents. Many who have passed resolutions of sympathy with the rebels, and have even signed petitions urging the Government to recognize them as belligerents, would be ashamed to own that they had done so if they knew who those rebels are and what atrocities they are committing. These sympathizers have been misled by the Cuban refugees, and their mouth-piece in the American press, into believing that the rebels are Cuban patriots, oppressed and tax-ridden and deprived of every liberty; who have raised the banner of independence and are followed by the whole population of the Island in their revolt against Spanish tyranny.

The fact of the matter is that the great bulk of the insurgents is composed of ignorant negroes and mulattoes who were left without employment at the end of the grinding season, and who were easily led into the rebellion by chiefs of their own race and ilk. Now let us see who these chiefs are.

MAXIMO GOMEZ.

Maximo Gomez calls himself the general-in-chief of the patriots. Is he a noted statesman or politician? Is he a financier or a merchant? Has he any interests in Cuba? No; he

is a foreigner, a native of Santo Domingo, and to judge by his acts, an adventurer. He fought on the side of the Cubans in the rebellion of 1868-1878, while a few years before he had fought on the side of Spain in the war against Santo Domingo, his own country. According to an agreement made between him and General Martinez Campos, Gomez received from the latter a sum of money and left the Island.

But, to show to all the world how little the cause of the rebellion concerned him, in 1878, after the conclusion of the war, he published in Kingston, Jamaica, a pamphlet in which he adduced arguments to prove that CUBA COULD NOT BE FREE. This is the man who has kindled war anew in Cuba, raising the cry of independence.

ANTONIO MACEO.

The right hand of Maximo Gomez is Antonio Maceo. He is an illiterate mulatto, and the men whom he has drawn into this unhappy conflict are colored men. Maceo has never figured as a public man. Before becoming a liberator he was a common muleteer. Of a daring spirit, he exercises, notwithstanding his low origin, considerable influence over the negroes of Guantánamo; but he is a cipher on the wrong side in the productive forces of the country; he is engaged in the present struggle because he has a passion for war, and the whites of the party regard him with disfavor.

DIONISIO GIL.

Another rebel leader, Dionisio Gil, is, like Gomez, a native of Santo Domingo; he has never figured in any way in Cuba; nor, as far as is known, has he any interests in the

Island ; and he may therefore be placed in the category of adventurers. If it is not self-interest that has launched him into war it is certainly not patriotism, for he is a native of another country and a stranger in Cuba.

THE DYNAMITER ROLOFF.

Carlos Roloff, the most inhuman and ferocious of the rebel leaders, is also a foreigner. He lived for some time in Cuba but he never attained any prominence there. He has fought in other wars, and everything points to the conclusion that he is a man who is fond of adventure and who has no love for any country. He was born in Poland and he is a Jew ; and by his acts proves to be a nihilist and a dynamiter.

OTHER BANDIT CHIEFS.

These are the principal leaders of the present insurrection ; but side by side with them, and enjoying all their confidence, figure a number of bandits, each of whom is the leader of a guerrilla band. Their principal exploits before the breaking out of the insurrection, consisted in kidnapping individuals and taking forcible possession of the property of others. Their names are : Mirabal, Matagás, Regino Alfonso, and Miró ; the last named is a criminal who is a fugitive from justice. Such are the men who figure in the "patriot" party ; and as their history is known to the Cuban people, their names naturally lend no moral support whatever, but, on the contrary, cast a great discredit on the cause of "Free Cuba." No cause, were it even a just one, could triumph with the support of men who are beyond the pale of the law.

NEGROES AND FOREIGNERS.

Others of the guerrilla chiefs are negroes. Only one of the leaders is known to be a man of means — Massó, a white man, but without any political influence outside his own district. Others of the leaders, previous to the breaking of the insurrection, lived outside of Cuba, and are citizens of other countries; they have therefore an adopted country which is not Cuba, and their presence in the Island now may logically be attributed to unworthy motives, to conceal which they invoke the names of patriotism and liberty.

These are incontrovertible facts and cannot fail to attract the attention of thinking men in other countries where public opinion has been misled by false reports as to the real character of the rebellion. If the movement was of a patriotic character, with noble and lofty aims, assuredly the leaders would not be foreigners but natives of the country, who would shed their blood on the field of battle in the cause of liberty. They would not make common cause with bandits; for no party who aspires to govern a country would accept the aid of outlaws, for this would be attacking an honorable principle at its very foundation.

RUIN AND DESTRUCTION.

But acts speak louder than words. It is now publicly known that the rebels are burning, day after day, villages, plantations, and private houses. This being contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, is it not natural for the impartial observer to ask himself to what purpose this wanton destruction of private property will serve? If the owners of the destroyed

property sympathize with the revolution, does anyone suppose that their possessions, doubtlessly the product of a life-time of labor, would be burned? No; these planters are ruined because they are loyal to Spain; because the welfare of Cuba, whose resources they are developing by their intelligence and their honorable labor, is dear to them. To the villages the rebels apply the incendiary torch because their inhabitants are loyal to Spain, and do not want to be freed by force.

Modern civilization condemns acts of savagery, and such are the acts of the rebel leaders—acts against which the immense majority of the Cuban people, who remain loyal to Spain, protest.

SHOULD AMERICANS SYMPATHIZE?

Such are the men on whose behalf the sympathies of law-abiding Americans are being solicited. We are told that it is our duty to help those men, with heart and hand, to obtain possession of that rich island; in other words, that we should be their accomplices in a robbery. They want to supplant Spain; they want to sweep the Spanish army from the Island; they want to drive the Spanish navy from Cuban waters; they want to rule over the people who are in possession of the cities, the towns, the villages, the farms, the tobacco fields, the sugar plantations, the mills, the factories, the mines, the stores, the railroads, the steamers and the docks of Cuba, and as they are not strong enough to do this alone, they ask us to help them to do it.

They ask our sympathy and our moral support. Why must they come so far for sympathy and support? Why is it that they cannot enlist the sympathies or the support of the

rest of the Cuban population? Why is it that not a single city, not a town, not a village in the whole Island has raised the rebel flag? Why is it that not a single corporation or institution in the whole Island has pronounced in their favor? It is simply because their character and aims are too well known there to deserve any sympathy or aid. They must seek these where their past lives are not known, where their names are held up by the press as those of patriots, and where their crimes and atrocities are represented as heroic deeds. This is why they appeal to the United States for recognition as belligerents.

VIII.

RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY.

Belligerents, forsooth! How little this term is understood, and how greatly it is abused! Recognition of rebels against a friendly nation is not a question of sentiment, but a question of international principle and law. There must exist, not a theory, but a condition, in order to deserve recognition by a great civilized power.

Wheaton, in his *Elements of International Law*, lays down this rule as regards the conduct of foreign *States* towards another nation involved in civil war:

"Until the revolution is consummated, whilst the civil war involving a contest for the government continues, other States may remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing to treat the ancient government as sovereign, and the government *de facto* as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy; or may espouse the cause of the party which they believe to have justice on its side. In the first case, the foreign State fulfills all its obligations under the law of nations; and neither party has any right to complain, provided it maintains an impartial neutrality. In the latter, it becomes, of course, the enemy of the party against whom it declares itself, and the ally of the other; and as the positive law of nations makes no distinction, in this respect, between a just and an unjust war, the intervening State becomes entitled to all the rights of war against the opposite party."

Mr. R. H. Dana, in one of his notes to Wheaton's *Elements of International Law*, quoted above, says:

"The occasion for the accordance of belligerent rights arises when a civil conflict exists within a foreign State. The reason which requires and can alone justify this step by the government of another country, is that *its own rights and interests are so far affected as to require a defi-*

nition of its own relations to the parties. Where a parent government is seeking to subdue an insurrection, and the insurgents claim a political nationality and belligerent rights which the parent government does not concede, a recognition by a foreign State of full belligerent rights, *if not justified by necessity, is a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, and of censure upon the parent government.* * * *

Recognition is *of a fact.* The tests to determine the question are serious and far more decisive where there is maritime war and commercial relations with foreigners. Among the tests, are the existence of a *de facto* political organization of the insurgents, *sufficient in character, population and resources, to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a State;* the actual employment of military forces on each side, *acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war;* and at sea, *employment by the insurgents of commissioned cruisers* and the exercise by the parent government of the rights of blockade of insurgent ports against neutral commerce, and of stopping and searching neutral vessels at sea. If all these elements exist, the condition of things is undoubtedly war.

"As to the relation of the foreign State to the contest, if it is solely on land, and if the foreign State is not contiguous, *it is difficult to imagine a call for the recognition.* If the foreign State recognizes belligerency in the insurgents, it releases the parent State from responsibility for whatever may be done by the insurgents, or not done by the parent State where the insurgent power extends."

RECOGNITION OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

The United States had some experience in this line, during the war of secession. American statesmen had something to say in regard to the recognition of Confederate rebels by foreign powers, and they said it forcibly.

We will append here a few utterances which we find in diplomatic correspondence, by way of illustration:

WE INSIST THAT A NATION THAT RECOGNIZES A REVOLUTIONARY STATE, WITH A VIEW TO ITS EFFECTING ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, COMMITS A GREAT WRONG AGAINST THE NATION WHOSE INTEGRITY IS THUS INVADED, AND MAKES ITSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR A JUST AND AMPLE REDRESS. * * * To recognize the independence of a new State, and so favor, possibly determine, its admission into the family of nations, is the highest possible exercise of sovereign power, because it affects in any case the welfare of two na-

tions, and often the peace of the world.—(William H. Seward to Chas. Francis Adams, April 10th, 1861.)

As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Confederacy, it is not to be made a subject of technical definition. A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as a recognition of them. No one of these proceedings will pass unquestioned by the United States in this case.

Hitherto, recognition has been moved only on the assumption that the so-called Confederate States are *de facto* a self-sustaining power. Now, after long forbearance, designed to sooth discontent and avert the need of civil war, the land and naval forces of the United States have been put in motion to repress insurrection. The true character of the pretended new State is at once revealed. It is seen to be a power existing in pronunciamiento only. It has never won a field. It has obtained no forts that were not virtually betrayed into its hands or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a single port on the coast nor any highway out from its pretended capital by land. Under these circumstances Great Britain is called upon to intervene and give it body and independence by resisting our measures of suppression. British recognition would be British intervention, to create within our territory a hostile State by overthrowing this republic itself.—(William H. Seward to Chas. Francis Adams, May 21st, 1861).

What is now seen in this country is the occurrence, by no means peculiar, but frequent in all countries, more frequent even in Great Britain than here, of an armed insurrection engaged in attempting to overthrow the regularly constituted and established government. There is, of course, the employment of force by the government to suppress the insurrection, as every other government necessarily employs force in such cases. But these incidents by no means constitute a state of war impairing the sovereignty of the government, creating belligerent sections, and entitling foreign States to intervene or to act as neutrals between them, or in any other way to cast off their lawful obligations to the nation thus for the moment disturbed. Any other principle than this would be to resolve government everywhere into a thing of accident and caprice, and ultimately all human society into a state of perpetual war.—(William H. Seward to Chas. Francis Adams, June 19th, 1861).

OUR DIPLOMACY TOWARDS SPAIN.

Even the arguments brought by our own statesmen before the government of Spain, to prevent its recognition of the Southern Confederacy, might fitly apply to the Cuban rebellion. Mr. Perry, our Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid, explaining

the interview he had with the Minister of State, señor Calderon Collantes, writes as follows :

Secession was filibustering struck in. I explained that, unhappily, a class at the south called by the slave owners "mean whites" were quite ready to follow their lead, and were a terrible instrument in their hands. Their own ignorance, their dependence upon the richer class, and their contact with the blacks had gradually reduced them, intellectually and morally, to a point of which, perhaps, there were few exceptions in the Anglo-Saxon race. They were as reckless of danger as they were of right, as ready to embark for the fever lakes of Central America as for the sugar fields of Cuba, or the wilds of Kansas, or a campaign against the government of their country.

This was good material for a rebel soldiery; and under the more intelligent lead of the slave owners this revolt was undoubtedly serious and would cost blood. But the result was not doubtful. The disparity of force and resources on the part of the government was too overbalancing to leave the rebels a chance of long prolonging the struggle.

Happily, between the ambitious class of slave owners and the so-called "mean whites," their instruments, there was a middle class in the south, more numerous than the two together, loyal to the Union and the Constitution. These loyal citizens were now held in a state of duress by the violence and intimidation employed by the slave owners and their instruments. His Excellency would have noticed that from the beginning to this day the rebels had not obtained the sanction of a popular vote to any of their high acts.—(Horatio J. Perry to W. H. Seward, Madrid, June 18, 1861.)

THE ATTITUDE OF SPAIN.

The representations made by our diplomatic agent were well heeded by the Spanish Government, as he wrote further :

The Minister of State not only renewed to me the assurance given to Mr. Preston, but amplified it, stating absolutely that if any commissioners or other negotiators should appear in behalf of the so-called Confederate States, the government would not see them nor recognize them in any capacity; that Spain would have nothing to do with the rebel party in the United States in any sense.

I might write this to my government, and say besides that her Majesty's first Secretary of State had promised me that within a few days, as soon as it could be declared, a decree would be issued by this government prohibiting all Spaniards from taking service on either side, and

ordering all the subjects of Spain to maintain complete neutrality in the contest now begun in the United States; that she would prohibit the entrance of southern privateers into any of her ports, peninsular and colonial, and prohibit the furnishing of any supplies to the rebels, whether arms, provisions, coals, ships, or any other merchandise which might aid in their revolt against the government of the Union. Armed ships, with their prizes would not be permitted to enter her ports. Spanish subjects would be forbidden to accept any letter of marque or other such document, or serve on board of any privateer; and no fitting out of vessels for the purpose of taking part in hostilities against the United States could be permitted, but impeded with vigor and severity.

The royal decree, issued shortly afterward, contained the following preamble :

Taking into consideration the relations which exist between Spain and the United States of America, and the desirability that the reciprocal sentiments of good intelligence should not be changed by reason of the grave events which have taken place in that republic, I have resolved to maintain the most strict neutrality in the contest begun between the federal States of the Union and the States confederated at the south.

The decree, containing several provisions to maintain strict neutrality, was acknowledged to be entirely satisfactory to the government at Washington.

GEN. GRANT AND THE CUBAN INSURRECTION.

But we have still another authority and a state document bearing directly upon the insurrection in Cuba and its recognition by the United States, to show that such a measure at the present time would be wholly unjustifiable and antagonistic to the best interests of our country.

In the annual message of President Grant to Congress, in 1875, when a former insurrection in Cuba had been in existence for seven years, the whole subject of recognition, both of belligerency and independence, and of intervention or

mediation, was carefully considered and presented in the following paragraphs, which make, just now, very interesting reading, voicing, as they do, the opinion of one of our most eminent statesmen, and an acknowledged high military authority on the subject.

The past year has furnished no evidence of an approaching termination of the ruinous conflict which has been raging for seven years in the neighboring Island of Cuba. The same disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity which has heretofore called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christendom has continued to blacken the sad scene. Desolation, ruin, and pillage are pervading the rich fields of one of the most fertile and productive regions of the earth, and the incendiaries' torch, firing plantations and valuable factories and buildings, is the agent marking the alternate advance or retreat of contending parties.

The protracted continuance of this strife seriously affects the interests of all commercial nations, but those of the United States more than others, by reason of close proximity, its larger trade and intercourse with Cuba, and the frequent and intimate personal and social relations which have grown up between its citizens and those of the Island. Moreover, the property of our citizens in Cuba is large, and is rendered insecure and depreciated in value and in capacity of production by the continuance of the strife and the unnatural mode of its conduct. The same is true, differing only in degree, with respect to the interests and people of other nations; and the absence of any reasonable assurance of a near termination of the conflict must, of necessity, soon compel the States thus suffering to consider what the interests of their own people and their duty toward themselves may demand.

I have hoped that Spain would be enabled to establish peace in her colony, to afford security to the property and the interests of our citizens, and allow legitimate scope to trade and commerce and the natural productions of the Island. Because of this hope, and from an extreme reluctance to interfere in the most remote manner in the affairs of another and friendly nation, *especially of one whose sympathy and friendship in the struggling infancy of our own existence must ever be remembered with gratitude*, I have patiently and anxiously waited the progress of events. Our own civil conflict is too recent for us not to consider the difficulties which surround a government distracted by a dynastic rebellion at home, at the same time that it has to cope with a separate insurrection in a distant colony. But whatever causes may have produced the situation which so grievously affects our interests, it exists, with all its attendant

evils operating directly upon this country and its people. Thus far all the efforts of Spain have proved abortive, and time has marked no improvement in the situation. The armed bands of either side now occupy nearly the same ground as in the past, with the difference, from time to time, of more lives sacrificed, more property destroyed, and wider extents of fertile and productive fields and more and more valuable property constantly sacrificed to the incendiaries' torch.

In contests of this nature, where a considerable body of people, who have attempted to free themselves of the control of the superior government, have reached such a point in occupation of territory, in power, and in general organization as to constitute in fact a body politic, *having a government in substance as well as in name*, possessed of the elements of stability, and equipped with the machinery for the administration of internal policy and the execution of its laws, prepared and able to administer justice at home, as well as its dealings with other powers, it is within the province of those other powers to recognize its existence as a new and independent nation. In such cases other nations simply deal with an actually existing condition of things, and recognize as one of the powers of the earth that body politic which, possessing the necessary elements, has, in fact, become a new power. In a word, the creation of a new State is a fact.

To establish the condition of things essential to the recognition of this fact, there must be a people occupying a known territory, united under some known and defined form of government, acknowledged by those subject thereto, in which the functions of government are administered by usual methods, competent to mete out justice to citizens and strangers, to afford remedies for public and private wrongs, and able to assume the correlative international obligations, and capable of performing the corresponding international duties resulting from its acquisition of the rights of sovereignty. A power should exist complete in its organization, ready to take and able to maintain its place among the nations of the earth.

While conscious that the insurrection in Cuba has shown a strength and endurance which make it at least doubtful whether it be in the power of Spain to subdue it, it seems unquestionable that no such civil organization exists which may be recognized as an independent government capable of performing its international obligations and entitled to be treated as one of the powers of the earth. A recognition under such circumstances would be inconsistent with the facts, and would compel the power granting it soon to support by force the government to which it had really given its only claim of existence. In my judgment, the United States should adhere to the policy and the principles which have heretofore been its sure and safe guides in like contests between revolted

colonies and their mother country, and, acting only upon the clearest evidence, should avoid any possibility of suspicion or of imputation.

A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion, impracticable and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest.

In a former message to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. Regarding it now, after this lapse of time, I am unable to see that any notable success, or any marked or real advance on the part of the insurgents, has essentially changed the character of the contest. It has acquired greater age, but not greater or more formidable proportions. It is possible that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts of Spain herself, of this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such recognition. But now, as in its past history, the United States should carefully avoid the false lights which might lead it into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide, of doing only that which is right and honest and of good report. The question of according or of withholding rights of belligerency must be judged, in every case, in view of the particular attending facts. Unless justified by necessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act, and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary, and it is required, when the interests and rights of another government or of its people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the sense of international law as war. *Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies, and their occasional conflicts, do not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the test recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of dignity, honesty, and power, when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government toward its own people and to other States, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers*

except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF EXPEDIENCY, I REGARD THE ACCORDANCE OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS STILL TO BE AS UNWISE AND PREMATURE, AS I REGARD IT TO BE, AT PRESENT, INDEFENSIBLE AS A MEASURE OF RIGHT. Such recognition entails upon the country according the rights which flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exaction from the contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and obligations. It confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption in the vessels of the United States, to detention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a part of which, in its traffic between the Atlantic and the Gulf States, and between all of them and the States on the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two States. There can be little doubt to what result such supervision would before long draw this nation. It would be unworthy of the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such result, by measures of questionable right or expediency, or by any indirection. Apart from any question of theoretical right, I am satisfied that, while the accordance of belligerent rights to the insurgents in Cuba might give them a hope and an inducement to protract the struggle, it would be but a delusive hope, and would not remove the evils which this government and its people are experiencing, but would draw the United States into complications which it has waited long and already suffered much to avoid. The recognition of independence, or of belligerency, being thus, in my judgment, equally inadmissible, it remains to consider what course shall be adopted should the conflict not soon be brought to an end by acts of the parties themselves, and should the evils which result therefrom, affecting all nations, and particularly the United States, continue.

In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible, mediation and intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water separating the Island from the Peninsula, the want of harmony and of personal sympathy be-

tween the inhabitants of the colony and those sent thither to rule them, and want of adaptation of the ancient colonial system of Europe to the present times and to the ideas which the events of the past century have developed, the contending parties appear to have within themselves no depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of peace-maker. In this view, in the earlier days of the contest the good offices of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the United States and of other nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in the Island; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall possess and control the Island to the exclusion of the other. Under these circumstances, the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must, sooner or later, be invoked for the termination of the strife. At the same time, while thus impressed, I do not at this time recommend the adoption of any measure of intervention. I shall be ready at all times, and as the equal friend of both parties, to respond to a suggestion that the good offices of the United States will be acceptable to aid in bringing about a peace honorable to both. It is due to Spain, so far as this Government is concerned, that the agency of a third power, to which I have adverted, shall be adopted only as a last expedient. Had it been the desire of the United States to interfere in the affairs of Cuba, repeated opportunities for so doing have been presented within the last few years; but we have remained passive, and have performed our whole duty and all international obligations to Spain with friendship, fairness, and fidelity, and with a spirit of patience and forbearance which negatives every possible suggestion of desire to interfere or to add to the difficulties with which she has been surrounded.

JINGOISM IS UN-AMERICAN.

Whatever be the clamor of the jingo press, there is no more ground for the recognition of the Cuban rebels now

than there was at the time President Grant sent the above message to Congress.

We must not let our good sense be carried away by the loud bravado of the jingo press, nor by the exciting declamations of the frantic sympathizers of Cuban incendiaries.

As a leading journalist has recently reminded us :

There was once an American who said :

"OBSERVE GOOD FAITH AND HONESTY TOWARD ALL NATIONS.
CULTIVATE PEACE AND HARMONY WITH ALL."

His name was WASHINGTON.

IX.

CONCLUSIONS.

From the foregoing arguments and statements, based on facts, official data and statistics, the following conclusions are drawn :

That public opinion in the United States has been misled by false representations ;

That only one side of the Cuban question has been heard ;

That the Cuban people are not in favor of the independence of the Island ;

That the men who are in arms against the Spanish government constitute a very small and insignificant minority of the population ;

That they are not true patriots like Washington, Lafayette, Bolivar, Sucre or Hidalgo, but bandits and desperadoes, mostly mulattoes and foreign adventurers ;

That the insurrection is principally fed from without by Cuban refugees in the United States—having no interests in the Island—and who, after becoming American citizens, violate our laws in order to involve their adopted country in foreign complications ;


That the adoption of cruel, barbarous and unnecessary measures by the rebels, and their wanton destruction of life and property, is in painful contrast with the humane policy of Gen. Martinez Campos, and in contravention of the recognized usages of modern warfare ;

That by their own acts and deeds of violence, as well as by their lack of cohesive strength and organization, such men

have placed themselves beyond recognition as belligerents, or even as the representatives of a patriotic cause ;

And, lastly, the sympathies of the American people should not be wasted on these so-called " patriots," but should be extended to the thousands of peaceful Cuban families whose homes have been made desolate by these vandals. And yet, not a voice has been raised for the true Cuban people ; that is, for the immense majority of the population of Cuba, who are and will be for years to come the real sufferers from the ruin and devastation which this untimely and unjustifiable insurrection is sure to bring upon the beautiful " Pearl of the Antilles."

AN AMERICAN.







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FROM THE LIBRARY

OF

RAMON DE DALMAU Y DE OLIVART
MARQUÉS DE OLIVART

RECEIVED DECEMBER 31, 1911

